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United States Discovery and Foreign Blocking
Statutes
Vivian Grosswald Curran
It is a privilege to contribute to this Issue of the Louisiana Law Review
dedicated to the career of my dear friend and admired colleague, Alain
Levasseur. His contributions to mutual common law and civil law
understanding are without parallel. The following Essay is intended as a
“translation” between the two legal cultures that Alain Levasseur has
illuminated for us throughout his professional life.
The reality between discovery in the United States and the foreign
blocking statutes that impede discovery in numerous civil law countries
has been an uncomfortable mixture of resistance, insistence, and conflict
for the nations involved. American courts grapple with the challenge of
understanding why they should adhere to strictures that seem to
compromise the fundamental rights of American plaintiffs, while French
and German lawyers and judges struggle with the challenges that United
States discovery rules pose to equally fundamental values in their legal
systems. This Essay seeks to address these issues.
In an era of transnationalized commerce, discovery in the United
States finds itself pitted against the blocking statutes that foreign nations
enacted to impede. Discovery in the United States has reached the status
of a quasi-constitutional—if not an outright constitutional—right.1 Judges
are highly reluctant to allow foreign defendants to diminish an American
plaintiff’s ability to discover evidence and frequently are also suspicious
that the blocking statute, offered as the reason for a foreign national’s
motion to withhold evidence, may be no more than a façade designed to
interfere with the American court’s jurisdiction. In Adidas (Canada) Ltd.
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1. See Imre Stephen Szalai, A Constitutional Right to Discovery? Creating
and Reinforcing Due Process Norms Through the Procedural Laboratory of
Arbitration, 15 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 337, 374–75 (2015); Ganesh Bala, Note,
Discovery—First and Fifth Amendment Privileges—District Court Should
Balance Threatened Harm to Constitutional Rights Against Requesting Party’s
Need for Relevant Information in Deciding Whether to Order Civil Discovery of
Information Privileged Under the First and Fifth Amendments, 27 VILL. L. REV.
198, 200 (1981).
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v. S/S Seatrain Bennington,2 the District Court for the Southern District of
New York quoted a report made to France’s National Assembly during the
process of debates that were a precursor to the blocking statute’s
enactment. The report highlighted the possibility that the law would not in
fact pose a risk to French nationals of incurring the statute’s ostensible
penalties, but would merely be a way for French defendants to evade
United States discovery:
A report to the French National Assembly recommended the law’s
adoption on the ground that it would offer French nationals “a
legal excuse for refusing to supply the information and documents
demanded of them [and] a judicial weapon which will at least make
it possible for them to gain time. The conflict thus created will block
matters for a time and will make it possible to raise the conflict to a
governmental level.” With respect to the potential penalties, the
report noted that “it is necessary not to misunderstand the actual
scope of these penalties . . . [because] . . . these penalties are applied
only on the improbable assumption that the companies would refuse
to make use of the protective provisions offered to them. In all other
cases, these potential fines will assure foreign judges of the judicial
basis for the legal excuse which companies will not fail to make use
of.”3
France and Germany enacted blocking legislation in response to what
those countries considered the excessive and abusive intrusion of American
litigants into the affairs of their companies, often by competitors.4 Further,
2. Nos. 80 Civ. 1911 (PNL), 82 Civ. 0375 (PNL), 1984 WL 423 (S.D.N.Y.
May 30, 1984).
3. Id. at *3 n.4 (quoting Report No. 1814, Nat’l Assembly Comm. on Prod.
& Exchs., 1979–1980, 2d Sess., at 61, 63–64 (June 19, 1980) (Fr.)).
4. See Kami Haeri, Laissez la loi de blocage tranquille!, GAZETTE DU
PALAIS, Feb. 29, 2012, at 7; Noëlle Lenoir, Le droit de la preuve à l’heure de
l’extraterritorialité, REVUE FRANÇAISE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF [R.F.D.A.],
May–June 2014, at 487; see generally GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 972 (5th ed. 2011)
(“[M]ost foreign blocking statutes . . . were precipitated by unilateral extraterritorial
discovery efforts.”). Born and Rutledge also point out that this is not universally the
case, as with older blocking statutes, such as the Swiss law of 1934, which was
enacted in response to Nazi German examinations of Swiss banking matters. Id.
On the impact of U.S. antitrust laws, see Note, Reassessment of International
Application of Antitrust Laws: Blocking Statutes, Balancing Tests, and Treble
Damages, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 197, 197; Bate C. Toms
III, The French Response to the Extraterritorial Application of United States
Antitrust Laws, 15 INT’L LAW. 585, 590 (1981).
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in continental Europe, the American-style pretrial evidence acquisition is
not permissible within domestic practice.5 In both France and Germany, a
deeply entrenched principle of law directly derived from Roman law
shields parties from an obligation to assist their opponent in litigation.6
This principle of law, however, exists in an overarching legal system in
which the legal representatives are committed to assisting in a search for
the truth that is less partisan than the American equivalent of zealous
advocacy. The judge, rather than the parties, conducts that search for the
truth.7
In France and Germany, documents and other information in the
possession of an adversary can be requested only through the judge and
then only with specificity.8 Thus, in advance of the request to the judge for
discovery from the other party, an adversary would need to know what
information the other party possesses and be able to explain to the judge
how that information is relevant to the requesting party’s case. Normally,
only the judge, rather than the parties, can request information in the form
of documents or other pertinent facts from each party and direct the course
of information gathering.9 Because American litigants are not used to
seeking judicial approval for each document sought and each witness
questioned, many of those litigants have a tendency to arrange for
American-style discovery in France and Germany without the knowledge
of French or German legal authorities.
The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters of 197010 was negotiated to facilitate foreign
discovery, create a systematic method that would shorten what could be
unpredictable time lengths for obtaining evidence abroad, and develop a
system that no state would consider an intrusion on its national
5. See, e.g., UGO A. MATTEI ET AL., SCHLESINGER’S COMPARATIVE LAW 762
(7th ed. 2009) (“In most civil-law countries, discovery is almost non-existent.”).
6. For Germany, see David B. Adler, Schritt in Richtung Beilegung des deutschamerikanischen Justizkonflikts? – Zur geplanten Einschränkung des Totalvorbehalts
gegenüber exterritorialer discovery-Anfragen US-amerikanischer Gerichte, IPRax,
July–Aug. 2015, at 364, 365 (“[N]iemand verpflichtet ist, dem Gegner die Waffen für
einen Prozess in die Hand zu legen . . . .”). For France, see JEAN HILAIRE, ADAGES ET
MAXIMES DU DROIT FRANÇAIS 157 (2d ed. 2015) (“Nul n’est tenu de produire contre
lui-même.”). The phrase from Roman law is Nemo contra se edere tenetur. Id.
7. PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STÜRNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 10–11 (2004).
8. For France, see James Beardsley, Proof of Fact in French Civil Procedure,
34 AM. J. COMP. L. 459, 460–61, 466 (1986). For Germany, see OSCAR G. CHASE
ET AL., CIVIL LITIGATION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 223 (2007).
9. See supra note 8.
10. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial
Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 241.
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sovereignty.11 In the landmark United States Supreme Court case of
Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa,12 however, the Court held that domestic
discovery rules from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instead of the
Hague Convention may be applied when appropriate on a case-by-case
basis.13 In the almost three decades that have followed, United States
courts have been inclined to favor domestic rules over the Hague
Convention.14
When documents are located outside of the United States, this means
by definition that the rules of civil procedure under which discovery is
conducted have an extraterritorial effect. This situation is problematic to
the extent that United States rules of procedure contravene foreign laws in
the nation in which the discovery is to occur. To the United States judge
and plaintiff, the procedure may not seem extraterritorial inasmuch as
discovery abroad merely subjects a litigant, who is a party to a United
States action and over whom the United States court has jurisdiction, to
discovery of documents that the party has chosen to keep abroad. On the
other hand, to the nation whose legal system has fundamental problems
with the nature of United States discovery in terms of privacy and other
concerns discussed herein, United States discovery seems both
extraterritorial and a breach of its national sovereignty.15 Similarly, when
foreign nations enact blocking statutes that forbid information from being
divulged in United States pretrial discovery, the blocking laws have an
extraterritorial effect to the extent that they will impact legal rights and
options of United States litigants in actions brought in a United States
court and intrude on the jurisdiction of those courts.16
United States courts generally have not been deferential to blocking
statutes that, as in the case of France, may make acceding to American
discovery a criminal violation.17 Indeed, some United States courts have
11. Gary B. Born, The Hague Evidence Convention Revisited: Reflections on Its
Role in U.S. Civil Procedure, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1996, at 77, 78.
12. 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
13. Id. at 534–38.
14. Born, supra note 11, at 86.
15. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 971–72 (citing relevant sources).
16. The French Supreme Court (Cour de cassation) has specifically held that
the mere fact of being extraterritorial in effect does not make a French law
unconstitutional. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision
No. 81-132DC, Jan. 16, 1982 (Fr.).
17. Loi 80-538 du 16 juillet 1980 relative à la communication de documents
et renseignements d’ordre économique, commercial ou technique à des personnes
physiques ou morales étrangères [Law 80-538 of 16 July 1980 on the Disclosure
of Documents and Information of an Economic, Commercial or Technical Nature
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been highly dismissive of these blocking statutes, describing them as a
ploy to evade legitimate discovery through sham punishments that need
never be applied.18
In France, the blocking statute had indeed never actually been applied
until 2007, when the French Supreme Court, the Cour de cassation, affirmed
a lower court application.19 In the years following, however, its application
has not seemed to alter the tendency of United States courts to overlook the
existence of the statute, as the French blocking statute was not met with
greater deference after 2007 than before. Meanwhile, the ability of
American courts to allow discovery that affects other nations has only
expanded.
In particular, under Section 1782 of the United States Code,20 litigants
in foreign suits in foreign nations may apply to an American court for
assistance in evidence gathering.21 While that legal provision is not of
recent vintage, the United States Supreme Court in Intel v. AMD22 held
that Section 1782 would be available to foreign litigants even if the
information sought was not discoverable in the foreign jurisdiction in
which the action had been brought and was proceeding.23 One may well
surmise that, although Congress intended Section 1782 to provide the
assistance of the American courts to foreign nations and thus to be a
positive contribution to their courts, the nations involved may perceive the
statute as a reinforced intrusion into the national sovereignty of foreign

to Foreign Individuals or Legal Entities], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE
FRANÇAISE [J.O.], July 17, 1980, at 1700.
18. See Bodner v. Paribas, 202 F.R.D. 370, 374–75 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (“As
held by numerous courts, the French Blocking Statute does not subject defendants
to a realistic risk of prosecution, and cannot be construed as a law intended to
universally govern the conduct of litigation within the jurisdiction of a United
States court. Thus, applying Aerospatiale and Minpeco, other courts have
uniformly declined to give effect to the French Blocking Statute, or to hold that
the existence of the statute requires that discovery of French defendants take place
under the Hague Convention.”).
19. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Dec.
12, 2007, Bull. Crim., No. 07-83228 (Fr.).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2014).
21. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 247 (2004).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 263.
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states.24 In Kulzer v. Biomet,25 for instance, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a German company, Hereus—which had sued the
defendant company in Germany—was entitled to American-style discovery
of documents located in the United States, even though obtaining those
documents through the German court system would have been impossible
because such discovery of an open nature is not allowed there.26 Despite
acknowledging the unavailability of such discovery in Germany, the
forum jurisdiction, the United States appellate court opined that the
plaintiff had not been trying to “circumvent German law” through its broad
discovery requests to the American court.27
Germany, like France, opted out of its duty to comply with the Hague
Convention letters of request under the Convention’s Article 23 opt-out
provision with regard to requests “issued for the purpose of obtaining pretrial discovery of documents as known in Common Law countries.”28
Germany also has blocking legislation, but is now amending the legislation
to end what is known as the deutsch-amerikanischer29 Justizkonflikt or
conflict between the two countries on the matter of evidence gathering.30
Whereas the current law forbids the discovery of any documents located
in Germany, under the pending legislation, some American document
24. See Pauline Dubarry et al., L’Obtention des preuves en France et à
l’étranger, LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE, July 14, 2014, at 1418, 1419 (referring to
Section 1782 as a “destabilizing” mechanism, allowing a private party to seek an
advantage of surprise in what strikes them as an ex parte procedure that can result
in a “traumatic” effect on its adversary, despite the adversary’s having an
opportunity to voice its opposition to the judge. The authors characterize Section
1782 as affording the opportunity to manoeuver around the Hague Convention’s
letters rogatory and note that French law has always taken the position that every
signatory State to the Hague Convention is obliged to follow its procedures in lieu
of national procedures on evidence gathering.).
25. 633 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011).
26. Id. at 595.
27. Id. at 597.
28. 847 U.N.T.S. at 245. Most contracting states have opted out of article 23,
thus avoiding an obligation to comply with United States pre-trial discovery. In
addition to article 23, article 33 offers an opt-out of deposition mechanisms. It
should be noted that the traditional civil law legal system does not permit a lawyer
to have any direct contact with an opposing party or witness. Only judges may
conduct the equivalent of depositions. In France in particular, in a civil (noncriminal) case, generally every communication would be in writing. See, e.g.,
Vivian Grosswald Curran, Globalization, Legal Transnationalization and Crimes
Against Humanity: The Lipietz Case, 56 AM J. COMP. L. 363, 377 (2008).
29. “German-American.”
30. On the Justizkonflikt, see Anke Meier, U.S. Discovery: The German
Perspective, DAJV NEWSL., Nov. 1, 2012, at 9–11.
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discovery, in principle, will be allowed to take place in Germany.31
Substantively, however, the amended legislation will go no further than
allowing what the Hague Convention prescribes.32 According to Dr. Adler,
the new law is intended to encourage American judges to modify their
inclination to use United States domestic laws of civil procedure on
discovery in lieu of the Hague Convention.33 However, given that a strong
body of case law has been developed over decades in the United States—
a common law system operating under stare decisis—the chances of this
modification reaching its desired effect seem doubtful.
Of course, as of December 1, 2015, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure as they relate to discovery also underwent amendment.34
Although the thrust of the amendments has been to curtail “fishing
expeditions” or the excessive scope of discovery, the amendments do not
impinge on the basic nature of discovery in the United States. 35 American
discovery remains vast and oriented to allowing parties to conduct their
own search for information without specific knowledge of the nature of an
adversary’s information and with a concomitant obligation to produce the
same to the adversary—the very aspects that cannot be adapted to
continental European systems of law.
An eminent French lawyer and former cabinet minister has suggested
that discovery in transnational litigation as it has developed in the United
States since Aérospatiale may constitute a violation of the European
Convention on Human Rights.36 She argues that such discovery denies a
foreign party a fair trial (procès équitable) inasmuch as failure to comply
with discovery may deprive a foreign corporation of its own right to
present evidence under the Federal Rules,37 a violation of one of the most
fundamental rights of every French—and other continental European and

31. See Adler, supra note 6, at 365.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 364.
34. Press Release, Dist. of N.D., U.S. Dist. Court, on Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure effective Dec. 1, 2015, http://www.ndd.uscourts.gov
/announce/FRCP_Update_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/AX4F-P3K9] (last visited Jan.
25, 2016).
35. The principal goal is to ensure that the scope of discovery becomes
“proportional to the needs of the case.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
36. Lenoir, supra note 4, at 499.
37. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37, 45; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442(2)(c) (1986) (providing that a
United States court or agency may make findings of fact adverse to a party even
if that party has made a good faith effort to comply with the foreign jurisdiction’s
blocking statute).
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every E.U. Member State—litigant’s rights.38 This right is known to the
French as the right to present opposing evidence or, literally, as the
principle or benefit of the contradictory (evidence): le principe ou le
bénéfice du contradictoire.39
Clearly, the Hague Convention on Evidence has not solved the
problem of foreign evidence gathering. No doubt one can describe the
problem as the insistence of United States courts to elude the treaty. The
deeper problem is that discovery is an entrenched, fundamental right of
the American litigant.40 Further, from the start, the Hague Convention has
included an opt-out provision, allowing foreign states to refuse such
discovery.41 Civil law nations and their courts have a duty to protect their
citizens from the reach of American discovery as much as their United
States counterparts have a duty to exert discovery. In 1994, Gary Born
suggested as a reform model that, in exchange for a binding commitment
that United States courts apply the Hague Convention, foreign states
would abandon Article 23 opt-outs under the Convention and execute
American letters of request for discovery delivered pursuant to the
Convention where the information sought was “materially relevant” to the
litigation.42
Noëlle Lenoir suggests that, for France, the solution is to persuade
both American judges and French litigants that the French blocking statute
must be taken seriously.43 She would like to see the statute applied much
more frequently so that United States judges understand that the statute
imposes a legal obligation to abide by the statute under pain of criminal
sanction to French nationals, and thus is far from the sham threat to French
citizens that United States judges often perceive it to be.44 She also would
like the fines attached to the blocking statute to be dramatically higher for
French litigants who violate the law by complying with American
discovery requests.45 She reasons that the current fines do not represent a
deterrent for multinational corporate defendants even if judges were to

38. See Lenoir, supra note 4, at 487, 499.
39. See Principe de le contradiction et droits de la défense, COUR DE CASSATION,
https://www.courdecassation.fr/publications_26/rapport_annuel_36/rapport_2012_4
571/livre_3_etude_preuve_4578/partie_4_administration_preuve_4589/principes_g
ouvernant_4591/principe_contradiction_26240.html [https://perma.cc/KZ43-KHCX]
(last visited Feb. 12, 2016).
40. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
41. See supra note 10.
42. Born, supra note 11, at 77–78.
43. Lenoir, supra note 4, at 493, 497.
44. Id. at 496.
45. Id. at 500.
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apply the blocking statute against French nationals with more zeal than
they do today.46
As law transnationalizes in the sense of ever-increased encounters
across the globe’s judicial fora, some harmonization will need to be
developed so that values from civil law and common law legal orders can
coexist. One option that has flourished is the non-state solution of
international arbitration, which has taken precedence over national courts
for the resolution of international disputes in private law. This institution
has so far proven flexible. International arbitration tribunals, often
composed of arbitrators from both common law and civil law states, may
allow a limited amount of discovery, enough maybe to permit a common
law American litigant adequate discovery for comfort. One might perhaps
phrase the situation more aptly in the converse: the application of rules of
general international arbitration may put litigants from common law and
civil law states in a condition of mutual discomfort, but a discomfort each
side seems able to accept.
All major international arbitration institutions permit discovery.
Arbitrators vary in how much they will permit, and the International Bar
Association rules refer only to selected aspects of American-style
discovery.47 For careful lawyers, however, the matter of discovery in any
future arbitration between contracting parties from different legal systems
can be regulated completely through the contract’s arbitration clause if the
lawyers on both sides can reach a mutually satisfactory agreement about
the amount and nature of the discovery they will be able to conduct in case
of a future dispute.
For the moment, the United States and other civil law nations lumber
forward in their task of better “translating” each other’s legal systems and
cultures to increase understanding and to enhance international
harmonization; perhaps that is the most for which one can ask.

46. Id.
47. 1999 INT’L BAR ASS’N WORKING PARTY & 2010 INT’L BAR ASS’N RULES OF
EVIDENCE REVIEW SUBCOMM., COMMENTARY ON THE REVISED TEXT OF THE 2010
IBA RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 7 (2010),
available at http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=DD2409
32-0E08-40D4-9866-309A635487C0 [https://perma.cc/TS3L-EFLB].

